Trader consensus prices "No" at 89% for a U.S. security guarantee to Ukraine by June 30, 2026, reflecting stalled bilateral negotiations amid U.S. insistence on linking commitments to a broader peace deal involving territorial concessions in Donbas. President Zelenskyy revealed in late March that Washington conditioned guarantees on Kyiv withdrawing from unoccupied parts of the region, a stance the White House partially affirmed by tying aid to peace progress, though denying direct pressure. Despite Zelenskyy's April 3 claim of nearing finalization and April 10 call for allied military presence, no binding Article 5-equivalent agreement has emerged, with upcoming diplomacy focused on ceasefire frameworks rather than standalone U.S. pledges. Historical patterns of unfulfilled assurances, like the Budapest Memorandum, further temper expectations for timely resolution.
Experimental AI-generated summary referencing Polymarket data. This is not trading advice and plays no role in how this market resolves. · UpdatedU.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by June 30?
U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by June 30?
$138,788 Vol.
$138,788 Vol.
Dec 31, 2026
$138,788 Vol.
$138,788 Vol.
Dec 31, 2026
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus prices "No" at 89% for a U.S. security guarantee to Ukraine by June 30, 2026, reflecting stalled bilateral negotiations amid U.S. insistence on linking commitments to a broader peace deal involving territorial concessions in Donbas. President Zelenskyy revealed in late March that Washington conditioned guarantees on Kyiv withdrawing from unoccupied parts of the region, a stance the White House partially affirmed by tying aid to peace progress, though denying direct pressure. Despite Zelenskyy's April 3 claim of nearing finalization and April 10 call for allied military presence, no binding Article 5-equivalent agreement has emerged, with upcoming diplomacy focused on ceasefire frameworks rather than standalone U.S. pledges. Historical patterns of unfulfilled assurances, like the Budapest Memorandum, further temper expectations for timely resolution.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Market Opened: Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ET
Volume
$138,788End Date
Jun 30, 2026Market Opened
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus prices "No" at 89% for a U.S. security guarantee to Ukraine by June 30, 2026, reflecting stalled bilateral negotiations amid U.S. insistence on linking commitments to a broader peace deal involving territorial concessions in Donbas. President Zelenskyy revealed in late March that Washington conditioned guarantees on Kyiv withdrawing from unoccupied parts of the region, a stance the White House partially affirmed by tying aid to peace progress, though denying direct pressure. Despite Zelenskyy's April 3 claim of nearing finalization and April 10 call for allied military presence, no binding Article 5-equivalent agreement has emerged, with upcoming diplomacy focused on ceasefire frameworks rather than standalone U.S. pledges. Historical patterns of unfulfilled assurances, like the Budapest Memorandum, further temper expectations for timely resolution.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volume
$138,788End Date
Dec 31, 2026Market Opened
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...Trader consensus prices "No" at 89% for a U.S. security guarantee to Ukraine by June 30, 2026, reflecting stalled bilateral negotiations amid U.S. insistence on linking commitments to a broader peace deal involving territorial concessions in Donbas. President Zelenskyy revealed in late March that Washington conditioned guarantees on Kyiv withdrawing from unoccupied parts of the region, a stance the White House partially affirmed by tying aid to peace progress, though denying direct pressure. Despite Zelenskyy's April 3 claim of nearing finalization and April 10 call for allied military presence, no binding Article 5-equivalent agreement has emerged, with upcoming diplomacy focused on ceasefire frameworks rather than standalone U.S. pledges. Historical patterns of unfulfilled assurances, like the Budapest Memorandum, further temper expectations for timely resolution.
Experimental AI-generated summary referencing Polymarket data. This is not trading advice and plays no role in how this market resolves. · Updated
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